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I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 2015, two mining dams located in the Minas Gerais 
region of Brazil collapsed, causing untold catastrophes as 50 million 
cubic meters of toxic iron-ore residue oozed into the surrounding re-
gion.1 The water is now unsafe for human consumption, and the ox-
ygen depravation and rising temperatures that the toxic sludge cre-
ates have killed any wildlife living along the 500km stretch of a 
nearby river.2 It was not long before the red sludge reached the At-
lantic Ocean.3 Brazil’s former leader, President Dilma Rousseff 
compared the disaster to the Deepwater Horizon event that befell the 
Gulf of Mexico in 2010, stating it may be the most devastating envi-
ronmental disaster in the country to date.4 Rousseff lays blame for 
the incident entirely on the company responsible for operating the 
dams.5 
As the toxic tailing dam sludge continues to wreak havoc on Mi-
nas Gerais and Brazil, the people of Greenland are also at a cross-
roads.6 In addition to its largely ice-capped terrain, striking glaciers, 
and bucolic landscape, Greenland’s southern Kujalleq region sits on 
top of a substantial mineral resource deposit containing gold, nickel, 
zinc, and what is believed to be the world’s second largest deposit of 
 1.  See Bruce Douglas, Brazil’s Slow-Motion Environmental Catastrophe Un-
folds, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com 
/business/2015/nov/13/brazils-slow-motion-environmental-catastrophe-unfolds. 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  See Alan Taylor, Red Sludge from Brazilian Dam Collapse Reaches the 
Atlantic, ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
photo/2015/11/red-sludge-from-brazilian-dam-collapse-reaches-the-
atlantic/417519/. 
 4.  Douglas, supra note 1. 
 5.  See id. 
 6.  See Saskia de Rothschild, Greenland’s Farmers Torn Over Tapping Pris-




MANNING FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2017  2:58 PM 
2017] MINING FOR COMPROMISE IN PASTORAL GREENLAND 933 
rare earth elements (“REEs”). REEs are used to make smart phones, 
electric cars, precision-guided missiles, and televisions.7 A large 
mountain in the Kvanefjeld region is also believed to contain the 
world’s sixth-largest deposit of uranium.8  
Greenland is home to a large indigenous population, whose prima-
ry economies include sheepherding, cattle, reindeer herding, and 
fishing—activities that the earliest settlers in the region relied upon 
for subsistence.9 Greenland’s economy also relies on exports of live-
stock with nearby partners Denmark and Iceland, with livestock and 
provisions constituting the largest export sector in 2012.10 While 
some members of the indigenous population support the mining ac-
tivities, others fear that it may destroy their native way of life and 
current economies.  
Before mining activities begin in full force, Denmark and Green-
land have the power to create a proactive framework for ensuring the 
protection of fundamental human rights in accordance with interna-
tional law.11 These instruments, combined with the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“GPs”), create a 
strong promise that a proactive approach to protecting and respecting 
human rights in Greenland can be achieved. Other indicia of progress 
toward a proactive scheme include opinions from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), publications from the International 
Council on Metals and Mining, and the adoption of National Action 
Plans to implement the GPs. The emergence of the right to food and 
the right to water in international law are also timely developments 
for the people of Greenland, who rely on agriculture not only as a 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See Brian G.J. Upton, Tectono-Magmatic Evolution of the Younger Gardar 
Southern Rift, South Greenland, 29 GEOLOGICAL SURV. DEN. & GREEN. BULL. 1, 
13 (2013). 
 9.  See STATISTICS GREEN., GREEN. IN FIGURES 2014, 6-7, 20 (Bolatta Vahl & 
Naduk Kleemann, eds., 2014), http://www.stat.gl/publ/da/GF/2014/pdf/ 
Greenland%20in%20Figures%202014.pdf. 
 10.  See id. at 7. In 2012, provisions and livestock totaled approximately $397 
million. 
 11.  See generally, Calin Georgescu (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights Obligations Related to Environmentally Sound 
Management and Disposal of Hazardous Substances and Waste, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/21/48 (July 2, 2012) [hereinafter Report on Human Rights Obligations Re-
lated to Hazardous Substances and Waste]. 
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cultural practice, but also as a livelihood. 
Despite this promise, problems remain and ultimately more action 
may need to be taken. As the Minas Gerais situation in Brazil indi-
cates, there are signs that states remain unwilling to provide clear 
protections for indigenous populations. Such populations still lack a 
strong voice in international affairs, while current enforcement 
mechanisms are still too weak. It will take the joint effort of states, 
businesses, the international community, and the indigenous people 
themselves to strike an appropriate balance between mining, the right 
to food, and human rights at large. 
Part II of this paper provides a brief introduction to Greenland’s 
indigenous people. It also discusses the recent deregulation of mining 
in Greenland and presents the competing views regarding whether 
mining should be permitted in the region. 
Part III of this paper provides an overview of the key international 
covenants that govern Denmark’s and Greenland’s duty to its indige-
nous people and examines two cases brought before the ECtHR, 
which shed light on how the Court may resolve any dispute brought 
by the Greenlanders alleging that the mining activities violate inter-
national law. 
Last, Part IV of this paper focuses on the role that the GPs can 
play in helping both the mining companies and Greenland to respect 
and protect human rights, and remedy violations. It concludes by as-
sessing whether current efforts by the states and/or businesses have 
been sufficient and highlighting the problems that remain. 
II. A REGION DEFINED BY HISTORY, POLITICS, 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES 
Greenland has been populated for roughly 4,500 years by Arctic 
peoples whose ancestors migrated to the island from Canada.12 Ac-
 12.  See Independence I, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE PRINCE’S PALACE  
NY VESTERGADE, http://natmus.dk/footermenu/organisation/forskning-og-
formidling/nyere-tid-og-verdens-kulturer/etnografisk-samling/arktisk-
forskning/prehistory-of-greenland/independence-i/ (stating that Independence I is 
the oldest culture in North and Northeast Greenland and that its sites are recog-
nized from the Canadian High Arctic archipelago from which they spread into 
Greenland); see also Saqqaq, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE PRINCE’S  
PALACE NY VESTERGADE, http://natmus.dk/footermenu/organisation/forskning-og-
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cording to some researchers, Greenland’s indigenous peoples de-
scended from the Thule Culture, an Eskimo population that spread 
throughout the region during the tenth century.13 Today, the island 
has a population of nearly 57,000, almost 80 percent of which is 
comprised of either Inuit descendants, or mixed Inuit/Danish.14 
Agriculture has played a central role in supporting Inuit popula-
tions for centuries.15 The current Inuit diet bears many similarities to 
the diet of the Inuit ancestors who first populated the island, consist-
ing of whale, seal, fish, land and sea birds, and meat from land ani-
mals.16 Food-gathering not only remains a central component of dai-
ly life for Greenlanders, particularly for those who choose a self-
subsisting lifestyle, but it also provides the majority of jobs available 
in the region and contributes a massive amount to the island’s econ-
omy.17 Public administration and service provides 38 percent of 
jobs.18 The next largest job sector is the fishing, hunting, and agricul-
tural sector.19  
Since 1814, Denmark has controlled Greenland.20 In 1953, Green-
land joined the Danish Realm through Denmark’s Constitution.21 In 
formidling/nyere-tid-og-verdens-kulturer/etnografisk-samling/arktisk-
forskning/prehistory-of-greenland/saqqaq/ (noting that the Saqqaq culture, also ap-
pearing on Canada’s Ellesmere Island, is the earliest known Palaeo-Eskimo culture 
in West and Southeast Greenland). 
 13.  See Kevin Hillstrom, Culture of Greenland, COUNTRIES AND THEIR 
CULTURES, http://www.everyculture.com/Ge-It/Greenland.html (last visited Jan. 
14, 2017). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See P. de Knijff et al., Lipoprotein Profile of a Greenland Inuit Popula-
tion: Influence of Anthropometric Variables, Apo E and A4 Polymorphism, and 
Lifestyle, 12 J. OF THE AM. HEART ASS’N 1371-72 (1992). 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See STATISTICS GREEN., supra note 9, at 13-16 (stating that fishing is the 
country’s primary industry and providing data on fishing, whaling, livestock, and 
the hunting of birds, land mammals, and seals). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  World Facts: Nordic Countries, WORLD ATLAS, 
http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/nordic-countries.html (last modified Sept. 27, 
2016) (identifying Greenland as falling under Danish control at the conclusion of 
the Denmark-Norway union). 
 21.  See Compare Nations, ASS’N OF RELIGION DATA ARCHIVES, 
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/multicompare.asp?c=43&c=94 (last vis-
ited Jan. 14, 2017). 
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1979, Greenland received the authority to operate under a so-called 
“home rule” scheme, further divesting it from Danish oversight.22 In 
2008, the Greenlanders approved the Self-Government Act by refer-
endum, which transferred even more authority to the local Green-
landic government from the Danish royal authority.23 According to 
the referendum, Greenland now oversees its policing power, judicial 
system, corporate law, legal systems, financial oversight and regula-
tion, and mineral resource activities.24 Still, Greenland remains reli-
ant on a $600 million annual subsidy from Denmark.25 The subsidy 
is designed to reduce gradually overtime with the expectation that 
Greenland’s economy will become strong enough to sustain itself.26  
A.  A CULTURE TORN AT THE CROSSROADS 
In October 2013, the Greenlandic home rule parliament voted to 
lift its long-standing “zero tolerance” ban prohibiting the mining of 
radioactive materials, a policy that originated in Denmark.27 The vote 
was incredibly narrow; the lift on the ban passed with a 15-14 vote.28 
Discussions preceding the vote reflected many of the tensions under-
pinning Greenland’s conflicted views toward mining. Greenland 
Prime Minister Aleqa Hammond said: “We cannot live with unem-
ployment and cost of living increases while our economy is at a 
standstill. It is therefore necessary that we eliminate zero tolerance 
 22.  See Politics in Greenland, NAALAKKERSUISUT, http://naalakkersuisut.gl/ 
en/About-government-of-greenland/About-Greenland/Politics-in-Greenland (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2017) (describing Greenland’s political history, including the Janu-
ary 1979 referendum in which 64 percent of Greenland voters supported greater 
autonomy, which precipitated the Greenland Home Rule policy in May). 
 23.  See The Greenland Self-Government Arrangement, STATSMINISTERIET, 
http://www.stm.dk/_a_2957.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2017). 
 24.  See id. However, Greenland does not have complete control over its polic-
ing power, judicial system, and financial sector. See Politics in Greenland, 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/About-government-of-greenland/About-
Greenland/Politics-in-Greenland. 
 25.  See Sarah Lyall, Fondly, Greenland Loosens Danish Rule,  
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/world/ 
europe/22greenland.html. 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  See Katya Vahl et al., Greenland Votes to Allow Uranium, Rare Earths 
Mining, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-greenland-
uranium-idUSBRE99O05A20131025. 
 28.  See id. (describing the debate that led to the vote as heated). 
 
MANNING FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2017  2:58 PM 
2017] MINING FOR COMPROMISE IN PASTORAL GREENLAND 937 
towards uranium now.”29 Before the vote in Greenland, in February 
2013, “Denmark’s parliament voted to allow uranium mining in 
Greenland in a historical policy shift after 30 years of opposition to 
nuclear power.”30 According to Denmark’s Head of Geology for the 
Ministry of Mineral Resources, “Greenland is pro-exploration and 
pro-mining now, both across the board in government and also with-
in the population.”31  
Greenland’s predominantly Inuit population, however, is torn over 
whether to support increased mining activities in the region, or 
whether to oppose mining entirely. Many tout mining as the answer 
to weaning the island off of the Danish subsidy.32 They believe that 
mining will provide Kujalleq and other regions with a better econom-
ic future, reduce the recent increase in local crime, and stall the 
steady stream of locals moving away from the region due to a lack of 
jobs.33 Many of Greenland’s seal hunters are considering quitting the 
trade, which some view as a threat to the longevity of Inuit culture.34  
Among some locals, the threat of increased “Westernization” and 
the extinction of the Inuit way of life create grave concerns, particu-
larly if a mining operation were to bring a slew of foreign workers 
and their families to the region’s small towns.35 Many view foreign 
workers who have already arrived to begin explorative activities as a 
potential source of competition.36 Others have characterized an influx 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Denmark Allows Uranium Mining in Greenland, EUROPOST (Feb. 15, 
2013), http://www.europost.eu/article?id=6780. 
 31.  Vahl, supra note 27. 
 32.  See Annegret Oster, Greenland: Race for Underground Resources, 
DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.dw.com/en/greenland-race-for-
underground-resources/av-17242788 (“Gold, titanium, rare earths and uranium are 
fueling the debate over Greenland’s independence from Denmark.”). 
 33.  Espen Rasmussen, The Fight for Greenland, VIMEO, 
https://vimeo.com/84892912 (last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (stating that Uranium 
could become the island’s economic future and that companies like Greenland En-
ergy and Minerals are seeking land rights for mining because such rare earth met-
als go into the production of cell phones and computers). 
 34.  See id. (citing the ban on seal pelts in the European Union as causing the 
value of seal hunting to decrease dramatically). 
 35.  See Oster, supra note 32. 
 36.  See id. (expressing concerns that up to one thousand workers could mi-
grate to the town after the mine opens bringing venereal diseases, an influx in chil-
dren with unknown fathers, and competition for jobs with the local men). 
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of foreigners as potentially reducing the native population to a “sec-
ondary people,” something they see as unhealthy for the Inuit cul-
ture.37 They see plenty of existing opportunities in agricultural and 
fishing in the region, and eschew the promise of relying on foreign-
ers to build the local economy.38 
Of course, exposure to radiation from uranium mining so close to 
the settlement of Narsaq is also on opponents’ minds.39 Uranium 
mining is particularly damaging to the local environment.40 Extrac-
tion produces waste referred to as “tailings,” which must be dis-
placed.41 Even for those in favor of mining, ensuring that extraction 
is done in an environmentally sound and non-harmful manner is a 
central concern.42 Those in support of mining are largely aware of 
the risks that uranium extraction poses, with some believing that ura-
nium mining is the riskiest option.43 
The potential harm to Greenland’s communal land ownership 
scheme is also a source of concern for many locals, especially those 
who rely on agriculture for subsistence.44 In Greenland, land is held 
 37.  Rasmussen, supra note 33 (“We saw this in Greenland in the 60’s and 70’s 
and how it is to be influenced by foreigners who arrive to rebuild the society. And 
then you are a spectator, a secondary people.  That is not a healthy society.”). 
 38.  See id., supra note 33 (proclaiming that Greenlanders have land, the ocean, 
and people, and if they were to live off of others coming from across the globe, 
that would be “doing things in the wrong order”). 
 39.  See Oster, supra note 32 (expressing concern about the uranium being 
mined so close to their town and what effects that will have on health). 
 40.  See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, PUBLIC 
HEALTH STATEMENT: URANIUM (2013), https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/ 
ToxProfiles/tp150-c1-b.pdf (explaining the negative effects of uranium exposure, 
which can come from eating exposed vegetables, drink it in the water, or get it 
through dirt (for example, a child playing outside), which can lead to health com-
plications, particularly kidney failure). 
 41.  Uranium Mill Tailings, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N (Apr. 8, 
2015), https://www.nrc.gov/waste/mill-tailings.html (“Uranium mill tailings are 
primarily the sandy process waste material from a conventional uranium mill.”). 
 42.  See Rasmussen, supra note 33 (acknowledging that the inherent risk in 
mining must be accounted for nonetheless). 
 43.  See Oster, supra note 32 (registering concerns about the proposed location 
being the “most hazardous” to begin mining at and claiming that the mining com-
pany merely intends to cover the tailing from the mine with soil and rock frag-
ments). 
 44.  See Rothschild, supra note 6 (documenting the thoughts of several farmers 
who stand to abandon their land, which is their livelihood, should the mine be ap-
proved). 
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in communal ownership for mutual and non-exclusive enjoyment. 
Like most facets of modern day life in Greenland, this traces back to 
Inuit culture, which placed a premium on encouraging interdepend-
ence to promote survival.45 According to some sources, “Inuit fami-
lies that exceed normal living standards within their community typi-
cally distribute excess goods to poorer individuals.”46 Some fear that 
mining companies will take advantage of this communal land owner-
ship system and commandeer open space for mining activities or 
other applications.47  
Not all Greenlanders are of the opinion that further independence 
from Denmark is in the region’s best interest, with some believing 
that the relationship has led to improved health care, education, and 
increased standards of living in Greenland.48 The debate over extrac-
tive mining has become a taboo topic among the locals, who wish to 
avoid a conflict with friends and relatives who may hold a different 
perspective on what should take place.49 
B. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO MINING IN THE ARCTIC  
Geological uncertainty, logistical hurdles, environmental sensitivi-
ty, unforgiving weather and terrain, and technological inefficiencies 
have long plagued miners and extractors in the arctic region. Green-
land is the world’s largest island: between 80 to 85 percent of its sur-
face capped in ice, with the exposed areas creating a fringe along the 
island’s outer rim.50 In some places, the ice cap covering Greenland 
is nearly 10,000 feet thick.51 Transportation infrastructure is lacking 
 45.  See Hillstrom, supra note 13 (detailing that the nature of Greenlandic fa-
milial relationships, particularly kin groups and outside alliances, which stem from 
concerns of survival, both past and present). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See Rothschild, supra note 6 (relating the feelings of a woman suspicious 
of the potential miners and her government because if the mine construction oc-
curs, she will lose her land where she farms and runs a bed and breakfast). 
 48.  See Hillstrom, supra note 13 (explaining the tension between Greenlanders 
wary of Westernization and those more favorable to an ongoing relationship with 
Denmark). 
 49.  See Oster, supra note 32 (interviewing a fisherman who says he only men-
tions the topic at home because his village is small and, with respect to future min-
ing, the opinions of its residents are divided in two). 
 50.  See Greenland in Figures 2014, supra note 9, at 5; see also Hillstrom, su-
pra note 13. 
 51.  See Hillstrom, supra note 13. 
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throughout the region as well.52 Rough seas and nasty skies make sea 
and air travel difficult, if not impossible.53 During the summer 
months, the island averages a high of 50 degrees Fahrenheit, and 
plummets to an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit during winter—
deadly conditions for anyone left exposed to the elements.54 
One study regarding the feasibility of mining at Kvanefjeld has 
raised specific concerns about arctic mining in Greenland.55 The 
April 2014 study estimates that a uranium mine located in 
Kvanefjeld would lead to devastating and irreversible impacts.56 The 
proposed mine would constitute the first of its kind to be built atop a 
mountain, leaving the potential consequences and engineering nu-
ances of the project a mystery.57 Mining or REE ores would create 
substantial amounts of mining waste known as tailings, which consist 
“of a slurry of finely ground rock suspended in water and a mix of 
chemicals.58 According to one mining company, Greenland Minerals 
& Energy Ltd., the tailings would be relocated to Lake Taseq, and 
another waste site would be located “in a natural basin east of the 
Nakalak range.”59 Both sites would house radioactive materials.60  
 52.  See Greenland in Figures 2014, supra note 9, at 8 (finding that there are 
“[p]orts in [only] 16 towns and harbours in [only] 60 settlements, [only] 14 air-
ports” and no railways). 
 53.  See id. at 22 (explaining that because the country is not connected by 
roads, “[p]assengers and supplies of goods are transported by sea or by air”). 
 54.  See Hillstrom, supra note 13 (“The climate in Greenland [as] subartic, with 
short, cool summers and bitterly cold winters.”). 
 55.  See Jan Willem Storm van Leeuwen, Uranium Mining Kvanefjeld, 
CEEDATA CONSULTANCY 4, 11 (2014), https://noah.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/J.-W.-Storm-van-Leeuwen-Kvanefjeld-report-April-
2014.pdf (identifying the potential hazards associated with uranium mining as the 
primary concern). 
 56.  See id. at 11 (finding that pollutants associated with uranium mines nega-
tively impact the environment, particularly, water quality, sediments, soils, and 
air). 
 57.  See id. at 2 (reiterating that “the consequences of these features are poorly 
understood and may pose unknown risks for the environment and quality of life of 
the local population”). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  See id. at 2 (“Exposure to radioactive materials, even at low levels, can 
cause a wide range of cancers, lethal and non-lethal diseases, genetic malfor-
mations, stillbirths, premature aging and inheritable diseases, often with long la-
tency periods (years to decades).”) 
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The report also suggests “[s]eepage and spills of heavily contami-
nated water from the mining pit and from both [storage sites] are 
practically unavoidable.”61 Concern is also expressed over the long-
term effect of mining operations on the quality of water in ground 
basins, and the rate at which radioactive elements and chemical spe-
cies will leach into nearby rivers.62 Exposure to radioactive material 
at even low doses has been linked to a variety of harmful and even 
fatal conditions, including “a wide range of cancers, lethal and non-
lethal diseases, genetic malformations, stillbirths, premature aging 
and inheritable diseases, often with long latency periods [years to 
decades].”63 
Most notable, however, is the report’s indication “that no uranium 
mines in the world have ever been rehabilitated in an acceptable 
way: after depletion, the mining sites are simply abandoned.”64 This 
is due in large part to the fact that radioactive qualities remain in the 
tailings, rendering them extremely dangerous and incredibly toxic for 
thousands of years.65  
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW  
& EXTRACTIVE MINING 
Many sources of international law come into play at the intersec-
tion of mining and human rights, particularly in the context of the 
rights of indigenous peoples, the right to food, and the right to self-
determination. Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) are important bodies of international 
 61.  Leeuwen, supra note 55, at 2. 
 62.  See id. at 2 (“Seepage and spills of heavily contaminated water from the 
mining pit and from both RSFs are practically unavoidable. It is not known which 
chemical species, including radioactive elements, and at which rate will routinely 
enter the groundwater and rivers in the region, not only during the operational life-
time of the mine but also in the centuries following.”). 
 63.  Id. at 2. 
 64.  Id. at 2, 15-17 (explaining that the first phase of mine rehabilitation is to 
reduce the potential hazards by chemically immobilizing all harmful elements im-
mediately, while the second phase is to effectively isolate the harmful chemicals 
from the biosphere). 
 65.  See id. at 10, 16 (“The tailings consist of a slurry of mineral powder, 
chemicals and water, and contains an assortment of dissolved metals from the pro-
cessed ore.”). 
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hard law for the issues facing Greenland. The European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) provides additional protections while also 
establishing the ECtHR.66 Also, the Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples (DRIP) provides key guidance for addressing the 
special considerations that arise when mining activities occur in 
close proximity to indigenous populations like the proposed mining 
activities in Greenland. 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON  
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
The ICCPR provides that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination,” and that as a result they also enjoy the right to 
“freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”67 
The ICCPR imbues State Parties with a duty to “promote the realiza-
tion of the right of self-determination . . . .”68 Additionally, the 
ICCPR provides indigenous peoples with the power to control their 
natural resources. Article 1.2 of the ICCPR states: “All peoples may, 
for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and re-
sources” and provides that “[i]n no case may a people be deprived of 
its own means of subsistence.”69 The ICCPR also provides that eve-
ryone has a right to freely “seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers . . .”70 In fulfilling this duty, 
Greenland must be transparent in its decision-making process and 
not withhold information from the indigenous population or the gen-
eral public regarding extractive mining. It must also allow residents 
to express their opinions about the mining activities without fear of 
retribution. 
 
 66.  European Convention on Human Rights, art. 19, June 1, 2010 [hereinafter 
ECHR]; see generally Treaty List for a Specific State: Denmark, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE (Jan. 16, 2017), http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/country/DEN?p_auth=6BAdbeSg. 
 67.  Denmark signed the ICCPR on March 20, 1968 and ratified it on January 
6, 1972 with some reservations affecting criminal proceedings under Article 14 
and Article 20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, ¶ 1, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 68.  Id. at art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 69.  Id. at art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 70.  Id. at art. 19, ¶ 2. 
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Indigenous peoples who represent the minority of a population are 
afforded explicit protection under Article 27 of the ICCPR: “In those 
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, per-
sons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language.”71  
The ICCPR places clear duties on States to uphold its provisions 
and to provide clear mandates for how the duties must be imple-
mented. Article 2.2, for example, requires state parties to “take the 
necessary steps . . . to adopt such legislative or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant.”72 Before it allows extractive mining to commence, 
Greenland would be well advised to enact legislation or take other 
steps to ensure that it has fulfilled its duties to the indigenous popula-
tion under the ICCPR.  
By these provisions, any extractive mining activities that prevent 
the indigenous population from engaging in seal hunting, sheepherd-
ing, fishing, or the other cultural practices upon which they rely 
would violate Article 27’s mandate. In order to fulfill its duty under 
the ICCPR, Greenland must take steps to respect and protect the in-
digenous populations’ access to hunting, sheepherding, and fishing.  
B. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,  
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
The right to food is embodied in the ICESCR, which Denmark rat-
ified in 1972.73 “The right to food is the right of every individual, 
alone or in community with others, to have physical and economic 
access at all times to sufficient, adequate and culturally acceptable 
food that is produced and consumed sustainably, preserving access to 
food for future generations.”74 For indigenous populations, securing 
 71.  Id. at art. 27. 
 72.  Id. at art. 2, ¶ 2. 
 73.  See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, art. 11, ¶ 1 (Jan. 3, 1976) (“The States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for 
himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions.”). 
 74.  Olivier De Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Final Re-
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access to food often requires the population to produce its own sup-
ply, typically using its productive resources and land.75 Indigenous 
populations must already strive for food security in the face of many 
existing challenges, including climate change, expanding develop-
ment, and uncertain legal and political climates.76 Extractive mining 
poses a threat to the right to food through environmental degradation 
and the forced evictions that often result in close proximity to mining 
operations and in areas where environmental harm results.  
In 2012, United Nations representatives spoke out about human 
rights issues related to the establishment of an open pit coal mine in 
Bangladesh.77 Reports indicate that areas within the proposed mining 
site include agricultural land and other land that supports occupations 
critical to the indigenous population.78 In response, the Special Rap-
porteur on the right to food stated: “The human right to food would 
be violated if people depending on land for their livelihoods, includ-
ing pastoralists, were cut off from access to land, without sustainable 
alternatives . . . .”79  
The Special Rapporteur encourages a broad approach to identify-
ing violations of the right to food caused by large industries like min-
ing.80 He states: “If local incomes were insufficient to compensate 
for the price effects resulting from the shift towards the production of 
food for exports; or if the revenues of local smallholders were to fall 
following the arrival of domestic markets of cheaply priced food, 
produced on the more competitive large-scale plantations developed 
port: The Transformative Potential of the Right to Food, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/57 (Jan. 24, 2014). 
 75.  See id. (identifying other methods for indigenous peoples to secure access 
to food such as earning an income and through social transfers). 
 76.  See id. at ¶ 3 (emphasizing the importance of adopting initiatives to allow 
for greater access to food). 
 77.  See Heather Plumridge Bedi, Right to Food, Right to Mine? Competing 
Human Rights Claims in Bangladesh, 59 GEOFORUM 248, 248 (2015) (“They 
warned that the project would displace hundreds of thousands of people, while de-
stroying fertile agricultural land.”). 
 78.  See id. (“A British mining company proposes the Phulbari open pit coal 
mine in an agriculturally important region of Bangladesh.”). 
 79.  Id. at 253. 
 80.  See id. (“The human right to food would be violated if people depending 
on land for their livelihoods, including pastoralists, were cut off from access to 
land, without suitable alternatives.”). 
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thanks to the arrival of the investor.”81 In addressing the Bangladeshi 
government directly, a group of United Nations independent experts 
said: “The Government of Bangladesh must ensure that any policy 
concerning open-pit coal mining includes robust safeguards to pro-
tect human rights.”82  
The mining problem in Bangladesh is not an isolated incident; 
states in Africa83 and Latin America84 experienced similar situations. 
There are numerous reports of how mining can threaten and even 
contravene the internationally recognized right to food.85 In many 
contexts, extractive mining has led to poor quality farmland and low 
production, a reduction in self-sufficiency, and loss of livestock 
and/or other sources of cash income.86 Disruption of farming cycles 
or livestock production cycles is an especially large problem, caused 
both by forced relocation and environmental harm that interferes 
with agricultural production.87 A “‘firmly established’ aspect of the 
relationship between human rights and the environment is that ‘envi-
ronmental degradation can and does adversely affect the enjoyment 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Press Release, Bangladesh Open-Pit Coal Mine Threatens Fundamental 
Rights, Warn UN Experts (Feb. 28, 2012), http://freeassembly. 
net/news/bangladesh-coal-mine/ [hereinafter Bangladesh Open-Pit]. Of particular 
concern to the United Nations was the “mixed messages” coming from Bangla-
desh’s government regarding the extent to which human rights had been consid-
ered, along with clear evidence that the projects were proceeding. 
 83.  See Sierra Leone: Mining Boom Bring Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Feb. 19, 2014, 3:55 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/sierra-leone-
mining-boom-brings-rights-abuses (identifying a mining company as the cause of 
villagers’ diminished access to food in Sierra Leone). 
 84.  See Nancy Long Sieber & Joseph Brain, Health Impact of Artisanal Gold 
Mining in Latin America, REVISTA, 66-67 (2014). 
 85.  See “What is a House Without Food?”, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (May 23, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/23/what-house-
without-food/mozambiques-coal-mining-boom-and-resettlements (detailing a sur-
vey conducted on twenty-six households a part of a larger community in Mozam-
bique forced to relocate due to mining operations. Human Rights Watch found that 
the number of households able to produce enough crops sufficient for the year 
plummeted from twenty to only one after resettlement). 
 86.  See Bangladesh Open-Pit, supra note 82 (“Nearly half the Bangladeshi 
population is food insecure, and nearly one quarter severely food insecure.”). 
 87.  See id. (emphasizing that if an “open-pit mine is permitted, it could dis-
place hundreds of thousands of people and lead to the violation of fundamental 
human rights”). 
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of a broad range of human rights.’”88  
Ultimately, the Special Rapporteur has advised that national poli-
cies designed to promote the right to food “should be conceived as 
participatory processes, co-designed by all relevant stakeholders, in-
cluding in particular the groups must affected by hunger and malnu-
trition—smallholder producers, fisherfolk, pastoralists, indigenous 
people . . . and agricultural workers.”89 
C. EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Denmark is a member state to the ECHR, which the state imple-
mented as law in 1992.90 Article 1 of the ECHR provides that the 
State Parties “shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention.”91 The 
Right to Life is clearly delineated in Article 2, and the Right to Lib-
erty and Security encompassed in Article 5.92 Additionally, Article 
14 prohibits discrimination against a number of groups, including na-
tional minorities.93 Article 17 makes it clear that nothing in the treaty 
gives any individual, body, or group the “right to engage in any ac-
tivity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the Convention.”94  
One of the most important protections provided in the ECHR is 
the Right to an Effective Remedy, which states “[e]veryone whose 
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall 
have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
 88.  Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment, Compilation of Good Practices, 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/28/61 (Feb. 3, 
2015). 
 89.  Final Report: The Transformative Potential of the Right to Food, ¶ 44. 
 90.  See European Convention on Human Rights, DANISH INST.  
FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.humanrights.dk/about-us/menneskerettigheder-
eu/european-convention-on-human-rights (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) (noting the 
significance of the Convention and the duty of the Danish courts to enforce it). 
 91.  ECHR, supra note 66, at art. 1. 
 92.  Id. at art. 2, 5. 
 93.  Id. at art. 14. 
 94.  Id. at art. 17. 
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capacity.”95 To that end, Section 2 of the ECHR establishes the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights, providing an international enforce-
ment mechanism for individuals to hold violators responsible.96 Hu-
man rights laws are only as effective as the ability of the persons for 
whose benefit they were enacted to enforce those laws and to hold 
wrongdoers accountable. This judicial mechanism is critical when it 
comes to facilitating resolutions of disputes involving mining, indig-
enous populations, environmental harms because it provides a neu-
tral and objective third party.  
While the majority of the rights provided under the ECHR are 
negative rights, providing the right to freedom from a certain situa-
tion or impact, the European Court of Human Rights has concluded 
that the Convention imposes positive obligations on states.97 Alt-
hough the Court has not clearly defined what a positive obligation 
entails, one Judge determined that they “require[] member states to . . 
. take action.”98 Other scholars have defined them as “the duty upon 
states to undertake specific affirmative tasks . . . .”99 Although some 
Articles impose express positive duties, other positive duties can be 
derived from a holistic interpretation of the ECHR: drawing upon 
Article 1’s mandate that States ensure rights are extended to all resi-
dents, the Court’s ruling that the ECHR must afford practical and ef-
fective rights, and Article 13’s mandate regarding the provision of 
effective remedial mechanisms.100  
These positive obligations add an additional layer to Greenland’s 
and Denmark’s obligations under the ECHR and further support the 
need for a proactive approach to investigating the feasibility of min-
ing in the region and ensuring that private mining companies respect 
the indigenous population’s human rights.  
  
 95.  Id. at art. 13. 
 96.  Id. at art. 19. 
 97.  See Ganna Khrystova, State Positive Obligations and Due Diligence in 
Human Rights and Domestic Violence Perspective, 1 EUR. POL. & L. DISCLOSURE 
109, 111 (2014). 
 98.  Id. at 110. 
 99.  Khrystova, supra note 97, at 111. 
 100.  See Khrystova, supra note 97, at 111. 
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D. THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (DRIP), 
which Denmark voted in favor of, lists a number of duties regarding 
the protection and the respect that the State Parties must afford to in-
digenous populations.101 Many of DRIP’s provisions are pertinent to 
the extractive mining issues facing Greenland today. From a proac-
tive standpoint, DRIP requires States to take an inclusive and proac-
tive approach to decision-making that impacts indigenous popula-
tions. Article 18 speaks to the role that indigenous peoples should be 
given in decision-making processes, providing them with “the right 
to participate in decision-making in matters which would affect their 
rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance 
with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their 
own indigenous decision-making institutions.102 Additionally, Article 
19 requires state parties to “consult and cooperate in good faith” with 
indigenous populations and their governing bodies.103 Accordingly, 
Greenland and Denmark must consult with the indigenous Green-
landers when determining the extent to which extractive mining will 
take place in the region. 
Next, Article 26.1 states: “Indigenous peoples have the right to the 
lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, 
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.”104 Based on Greenland’s 
communal land ownership scheme, any mining activities that would 
drive the Inuit from their traditional lands would violate DRIP. Addi-
tional protection against removal is found in Article 10, which states: 
“Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands 
or territories,” and that relocation cannot occur “without the free, 
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
after agreement on just and fair compensation, and where possible, 
 101.  The UN General Assembly adopted DRIP on September 13, 2007, by a 
majority of 143 states in favor, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the United States) and 11 abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bu-
rundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and 
Ukraine). G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/53, Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 102.  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 101, at 8. 
 103.  Id. at art. 19. 
 104.  Id. at art. 26. 
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with the option of return.”105  
To the extent any mining activity has the potential to encroach on 
lands belonging to indigenous groups in Greenland, the government 
must take appropriate steps to obtain consent and to provide just 
compensation. Because uranium extraction is so harmful to the envi-
ronment, some of the indigenous population may be unwilling to re-
turn to their land.106 
DRIP also includes key environmental aspects that are particularly 
relevant to issues involving extractive mining. Article 29.1 states: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection 
of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or terri-
tories and resources.”107 This same provision requires state parties to 
adopt and operate programs that assist indigenous peoples with con-
servation and protection.108 
Also, DRIP clearly provides that its protections are relevant at 
both a collective and individual level. Article 1 provides: “Indige-
nous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or 
as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as rec-
ognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, and international human rights law. DRIP also 
states in Article 4 that indigenous populations have the right to “self-
government in matters relating to their internal and local                 
affairs . . . .”109 
These provisions, taken together, mean that Greenland and Den-
mark must respect both their duties to individual indigenous peoples, 
in addition to any decisions or processes that the indigenous people 
organize to address the potential commencement of extractive min-
ing. Should Greenland go forward with extractive mining, it must 
take into consideration the indigenous population’s cultural way of 
 105.  Id. at art. 10. 
 106.  See Chelsea Gunter, The Case for Uranium Mining in Greenland, 48 
CORNELL INT’L L. J. 424, 440 (2015) (highlighting that after the Thule accident, 
Greenland’s citizens may be particularly sensitive to radioactive contamination). 
 107.  Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 101, art. 29. 
 108.  See id. (stating that indigenous people must give their free, prior, and in-
formed consent before hazardous materials is stored or disposed of on their lands 
or territories). 
 109.  Id. at art. 4. 
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life and the resources that are most important to it, like seals, live-
stock, and fishing—activities that are part of the indigenous peoples’ 
cultural heritage. Unfortunately, extractive mining would pose grave 
risks to each of these industries, which is something that the state 
must consider before it allows extractive mining to commence.  
E. INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Article 28 of the ICCPR established a Human Rights Committee 
(“the Committee”), comprised of representatives from State Parties 
to the treaty.110 Part of the Committee’s responsibility is to review 
reports from member nations regarding their progress in implement-
ing the treaty.111 The Committee also hears disputes filed by private 
parties against states claiming that the state has violated the ICCPR’s 
provisions.112 For State Parties to be bound to adjudication before the 
Committee, they must have signed and ratified the Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR, which Denmark did in 1972.113  
A number of indigenous populations have brought claims under 
Article 28 of the ICCPR alleging that a governing state party has vio-
lated the population’s right to enjoy its culture. Two cases from the 
nearby country of Finland shed light on the standard that the Com-
mittee will employ in analyzing any claim brought by the Greenland-
ers.  
1. Länsman et al. v. Finland 
In this case,114 the Complainants consisted of Ilmari Lansman and 
47 members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee, as well as 
members of the Angeli local community. The members of the au-
thoring party were of Sami ethnic origin and involved in reindeer 
husbandry.115 In their complaint, they alleged that Finland violated 
Article 27 of the ICCPR by executing a contract with Arctic Stone 
 110.  ICCPR, art. 28, Dec. 16 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 111.  ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 40. 
 112.  ICCPR, supra note 110, at art. 40. 
 113.  Sixth Periodic Report of Denmark Concerning the Int’l Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK 1, 4 (2015), 
http://www.ft.dk/samling/20142/almdel/reu/bilag/84/1550011.pdf. 
 114.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (1994). 
 115.  Länsman, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 2.1. 
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Company (“ASC”) allowing the quarrying of stone from a mountain 
adjacent to lands that were traditionally used for reindeer husband-
ry.116 According to their complaint, “[f]or reindeer herding purposes, 
special pens and fences, designed for example to direct the reindeers 
to particular pastures or locations, have been built around the village 
of Angeli.”117 The permit awarded to ASC provided for the transpor-
tation of stone removed from the quarry directly through these spe-
cial paddocks and pens.118  
The Complainants also alleged that “the transport of the stone 
would run next to a modern slaughterhouse already under construc-
tion, where all reindeer slaughtering must be carried out as of 1994, 
so as to meet strict export standards,” potentially disrupting the 
slaughterhouse’s activities.119 The Complainants also alleged that the 
site of the quarry, a mountain, was sacred to the old Sami religion 
and formerly served as a place where reindeer slaughtering took 
place according to traditional practices.120  
At the time the Committee considered the Complainants’ conten-
tions, only minimal test quarrying had occurred, with some 30 cubic 
meters having been extracted.121 According to the permit, ACS was 
authorized to remove 5,000 cubic meters of stone.122 
In response, the state alleged that “the company’s activity in the 
area [had] been insignificant, both in terms of amount of extracted 
stone (30 cubic meters) and the extent (10 hectares) of the quarrying 
area” on the mountain.123 In contrast, the author’s total area covered 
nearly 2,600 kilometers.124 The area that was sectioned off for quar-
rying contained only one hectare and was located four kilometers 
from the road.125  
Turning to the Committee’s jurisprudence under Article 27, the 
State cited the Committee’s statement in Lovelace v. 
 116.  Id. at ¶ 2.3. 
 117.  Id. at ¶ 2.2. 
 118.  Id. at ¶ 2.5. 
 119.  Länsman, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 2.5. 
 120.  Id. at ¶ 2.6. 
 121.  See id. at ¶ 2.4. 
 122.  See id. at ¶ 2.3. 
 123.  Id. at ¶ 7.6. 
 124.  Länsman, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 7.6. 
 125.  Id. 
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da,126which held that “not every interference can be regarded as a 
denial of rights within the meaning of Article 27 . . . [but] restrictions 
must have both a reasonable and objective justification and be con-
sistent with the other provisions of the Covenant . . . .”127 
In resolving the dispute, the Committee first framed the issue as 
“whether quarrying on the flank of [the mountain], in the amount that 
has taken place until the present time or in the amount that would be 
permissible under the permit issued to the company which has ex-
pressed its intention to extract stone from the mountain . . . would vi-
olate the author’s rights under Article 27 of the Covenant.”128 Next, 
the court acknowledged that reindeer husbandry is an “essential ele-
ment” of the author’s native Sami culture and that Article 27 protects 
an indigenous population’s native economic practices that have an 
essential nature.129  
Based on these tenants, the Committee rejected the state party’s 
assertion that Article 27 only protects traditional means of livelihood. 
Instead, the Committee concluded that the Complainant’s adaptation 
of “their methods of reindeer herding over the years” and use of 
“modern technology does not prevent them from invoking Article 
27.”130 In addition, the Committee took the Complainants’ concern 
that the mountain constitutes a place of cultural significance as well 
as the Complainant’s concern regarding the preservation of the quali-
ty of slaughtered reindeer into consideration.131 
Regarding the state’s interests, the Committee noted, “[a] State 
may understandably wish to encourage development or allow eco-
nomic activity by enterprises.”132 To that end, Article 27 precludes a 
State from denying a member of a minority his or her right to enjoy 
his or her culture. However, where a measure only has “a certain lim-
ited impact on the way of life of persons belonging to a minority,” 
then there will be no violation of this mandate.133  
 126.  Human Rights Comm., Lovelace v. Canada, Comm. No. R.6/24, U.N. 
Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166 (1981). 
 127.  Id. ¶ 15-16. 
 128.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 9.1. 
 129.  Id. ¶ 9.2. 
 130.  Id. ¶ 9.3. 
 131.  Id. ¶ 9.3. 
 132.  Id. ¶ 9.4. 
 133.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 9.4. 
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Applied to the case at hand, the Committee considered whether the 
impact of the quarrying activities on the mountain was so substantial 
that they effectively denied the Complainants’ right to enjoy their 
cultural practices in the area.134 In finding no violation of Article 27, 
the Committee noted the limited amount of quarrying that had taken 
place at the time of the complaint, and that the State party’s consid-
eration of the Complainants’ interests during the proceedings leading 
up to the issuance of the permit.135 The record showed that the gov-
ernment had consulted directly with the Sami before issuing the per-
mit.136  
The second factor compelling the Committee’s decision was that 
the area did “not appear to have been adversely affected by the quar-
rying in the amount that had occurred.”137 Additionally, the permit-
ting process showed that the State authorities only permitted quarry-
ing activities that would have a minimal impact on herding in the 
region and on the environment, as shown by the conditions provided 
in the permit.138 The permit also specified that any quarrying activi-
ties should be primarily performed outside areas used for reindeer 
husbandry, and that the local forestry authorities and mining compa-
ny could appropriately accommodate their herding practices.139 
Despite failing to find a violation of Article 27, the Committee in-
cluded one important warning in response to the Complainants’ con-
cerns about future activities and the expansion of mining: “economic 
activities must, in order to comply with Article 27, be carried out in a 
way that the Complainants continue to benefit from reindeer hus-
bandry.”140 In the event that mining activities in the region were “ap-
proved on a larger scale and significantly expanded by those compa-
nies to which exploration permits [were] issued, then this may 
constitute a violation of the Complainants’ rights under Article  
27 . . . .”141 
The Länsman v. Finland  case bears particular significance for the 
 134.  Id. ¶ 9.5. 
 135.  Id. ¶ 9.6. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 9.7. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. ¶ 9.8. 
 141.  Id. 
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Greenlanders. If the Greenlandic government grants uranium or REE 
mining permits to foreign companies, it must consult with the indig-
enous population during the permitting process and find ways to ac-
commodate the population’s reliance on seal hunting, sheepherding, 
and fishing.142 If the Greenlanders wish to bring a complaint to the 
Committee alleging a violation of Article 27, they should demon-
strate that the mining activities have had, or will have, a tangible ad-
verse effect on their ability to continue their customary practices, i.e., 
fishing, hunting, sheepherding, etc.143 
Conversely, the Länsman v. Finland case provides importance 
guidance for Greenland regarding the steps it must take to protect the 
indigenous population’s rights under Article 27. Greenland must en-
sure that permits for extractive mining do not incorporate any land 
used for seal hunting, sheepherding, or fishing, and only permit min-
ing activities that would have a “minimal impact” on these practices. 
To the extent Greenland wishes to enlarge mining rights under a 
permit in the future, the Länsman v. Finland  case suggests that the 
government would need to once again consult the indigenous popula-
tion and ensure that any mining activities do not prevent the indige-
nous population from benefitting from their cultural practices and in-
dustries.144 
2. Jouni Länsman et al. v. Finland 
In this case,145 a group of native Sami reindeer herders brought a 
complaint alleging that state-authorized logging violated the Com-
plainants’ rights under Article 27.146 The Complainants alleged that 
the Finnish forestry authority approved logging activities in areas 
near and within the Angeli area, a region used by the Complainants 
and other Sami for reindeer husbandry.147 The Complainants alleged 
that prior logging activities had a detrimental impact on their rights 
as indigenous reindeer herders, and that proposed logging activities 
 142.  Id. ¶ 9.5. 
 143.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 9.5. 
 144.   Id. ¶ 9.6. 
 145.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992. 
 146.  Jouni Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001 (2005), ¶ 10.6. 
 147.  Id. 
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would exacerbate these issues.148  
According to the complaint, “some 1,600 hectares of the Herds-
men’s Committee’s grazing area in Paadarskaidi [had] been logged, 
accounting for some 40 percent of lichen (utilized for feeding rein-
deer) in that specific area.”149 The Complainants also alleged “rein-
deer tend to avoid areas being logged or prepared for logging,”150 and 
that this prompts them to “stray to seek other pastures and thereby 
incur additional labour for the herders.”151 The waste produced from 
logging activities also impeded the reindeers’ normal grazing activi-
ties, while compacted snow prohibited them from digging for for-
age.152 As a result, the herdsmen complained that they were required 
to bear the expense of providing additional feed for their reindeer.153 
At the time of the complaint, Finland had in place specific laws to 
limit the number of reindeer, known as the Reindeer Herding Act.154 
The dual intent of these regulations was to ensure the economic 
prosperity of the indigenous population’s reliance on the reindeer 
herding industry as well as to ensure that reindeer husbandry would 
remain a sustainable activity for the region.155 In the years leading up 
to the complaint, the Ministry in charge of implementing these regu-
lations determined that the availability of winter forage for the rein-
deer was so low that a herd reduction of 15 percent was appropri-
ate.156 According to the herdsmen, the limited availability of forage 
was primarily the result of logging activities in the region.157 Despite 
this, the Herdsmen alleged, “the National Forest & Park Service con-
tinue[d] to conduct logging operations, destroying the Herdsmen’s 
Committee’s pastures, and further deteriorating husbandry condi-
tions.”158  
 
 148.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 3.1. 
 149.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 3.1. 
 150.  Id. ¶ 3.2. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. ¶ 3.3. 
 154.  Id. ¶ 3.4. 
 155.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 3.4. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. ¶ 3.5. 
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In response, Finland first acknowledged that the Herdsmen be-
longed to the native Sami population and were an indigenous people 
according to Article 27.159 It also contended that “due care was exer-
cised for all logging operations carried out in State-owned forests in 
northern Finland,”160 and that the logging activities in recent years 
were performed primarily to ensure proper forest growth.161 The 
State also noted that the Herdsmen’s Committee operates an area to-
taling roughly 248,000 hectares and that only 16,100 hectares of that 
land are used for State-implemented forestry activities, comprising 
6.5 percent of the Herdsmen’s Committee’s area.162 Finland denied 
there was additional logging activities planned for the Angeli re-
gion.163 
Regarding the reduction of the herd limit per the Reindeer Herding 
Act, Finland cited the harsh climate and severe conditions affecting 
the region, and noted that the then-current maximum number of rein-
deer was substantially higher than the limit in prior decades.164 Fin-
land went on to argue that the unfavorable state of the herding lands 
was more attributable to the overgrazing of reindeer than any logging 
activity in the region.165 Finland relied on a report from the Finnish 
Game and Fisheries Research Institute in making this argument.166  
The Herdsmen refuted Finland’s allegations stating that the log-
ging activity had a minimal impact on grazing, and noted that the 
same report identified supplemental feeding as a necessary condition 
for ensuring that the loggings do not have detrimental impact on 
reindeer grazing land.167 Ultimately, the herdsmen claimed that the 
“effects of logging operations are long-term, practically permanent, 
and that the measures employed create new damage, exacerbate ex-
isting damage, and extend the area affected by logging.”168 As a re-
sult of these detriments, the reindeer herds became more susceptible 
 159.  Id. ¶ 7.2. 
 160.  Id. ¶ 7.4. 
 161.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 7.4. 
 162.  Id. ¶ 7.5. 
 163.  Id. ¶ 7.6. 
 164.  Id. ¶ 7.9-7.10. 
 165.  Id. ¶ 7.10. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 8.7. 
 168.  Id. 
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to naturally occurring conditions like heavier snowfall, delayed arri-
val of spring, and increases in predatory pressure.169 
In considering the merits of the parties’ claims, the Committee 
first noted that the Complainants are an undisputed minority within 
the ambit of Article 27’s protections, and that reindeer husbandry is 
“an essential element” of their economic viability and culture.170 The 
court cited its statement in the prior case,171 however, that measures 
having “only a limited impact on the way of life and livelihood of 
persons belonging to a minority will not necessarily amount to a de-
nial of the right under Article 27.”172  
Building on this jurisprudence, the Committee stated that when as-
sessing state action, a violation of Article 27 “may result from the 
combined effects of a series of actions or measures taken by a State 
party over a period of time and in more than one area of the State oc-
cupied by that minority.”173 As a result, the Committee “must con-
sider the overall effects of such measures on the ability of the minori-
ty concerned to continue to enjoy their culture.”174 This consideration 
is not limited temporally, but includes evaluation of “the effects of 
past, present and planned future logging on the Complainants’ ability 
to enjoy their culture in community with other members of their 
group.”175 
Applying this approach to the dispute at hand in Jouni Länsman v. 
Finland, the Committee concluded that Finland’s logging activities 
did not constitute a violation of the Herdsmen’s rights under Article 
27.176 It also noted the clear disagreement between the parties on the 
impact of the logging on reindeer husbandry and the Ministry’s deci-
sion to reduce the maximum herd size, and found that both parties 
had raised legitimate concerns.177 Moreover, while the forestry report 
did indicate that logging would place additional pressure on reindeer 
husbandry, the Committee made particular mention of other docu-
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. ¶ 10.1. 
 171.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992. 
 172.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 10.1. 
 173.  Id. ¶ 10.2. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 177.  Id. ¶ 10.2. 
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ments before it describing other factors contributing to the low prof-
itability of reindeer husbandry, and that despite these difficulties, the 
total reindeer population remained high.178 Accordingly, the Commit-
tee held that the logging activities were “not shown to be serious 
enough as to amount to a denial of the Complainants’ right to enjoy 
their own culture in community with other members of their group 
under Article 27 of the Covenant.”179 
A main takeaway for this case is that extractive mining activities 
can be assessed altogether and across various regions and that have 
occurred over a long period of time. If there is approval for mining, 
the indigenous population ought to establish a network to communi-
cate about the impact of extractive mining and to collect information 
from across the region in the event the indigenous population needs 
to bring a complaint before the Committee.180 In addition, like the 
previous case, the Sami herdsmen failed to show that the logging ac-
tivities posed a “serious enough” impact on their ability to engage in 
reindeer husbandry.181 If Greenland’s indigenous population brings a 
complaint, the Committee will assess whether extractive mining is 
having a “serious enough” impact on their ability to seal hunt, shep-
herd, and fish. The Committee will also assess whether any factors 
besides extractive mining are harming the indigenous populations 
rights. 
F. DESPITE PROGRESS, PROBLEMS REMAIN 
These cases illustrate that while the State is responsible for most 
permitting activities and oversight, private companies are the prima-
ry actors. The cases underscore the fact that corporate activities can 
affect human rights and that it is often difficult to hold multinational 
corporations accountable for human rights violations in foreign 
land.182  
 178.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶ 10.3. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See, e.g., Talking Transparency: A Guide for Communicating the Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI 12-14 (2008) [hereinafter Talking 
Transparency] (introducing a multi-stakeholder initiative that forms a network to 
dialogue and debate oil, gas, and mining projects in various countries). 
 181.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992, ¶ 10.3. 
 182.  Länsman et al. v. Finland, Comm. No. 511/1992; Länsman et al. v. Fin-
land, Commc’n No. 1023/2001. 
 
MANNING FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2017  2:58 PM 
2017] MINING FOR COMPROMISE IN PASTORAL GREENLAND 959 
There are signs of both promise and progress when it comes to 
States’ willingness to hold private businesses accountable. In De-
cember 2015, for example, a Dutch appeals judge overruled a 2013 
decision of a lower court and ruled that a court in the Netherlands 
should hear a case against Royal Dutch Shell brought by four Nigeri-
an farmers.183 In January 2016, the Supreme Court of the United 
States upheld a lower court’s ruling that an action brought my two 
Malian residents against Nestle, a leading global food manufacturer, 
alleging that Nestle aided and abetted human rights violations by 
purchasing cocoa from Ivory Coast could proceed in Federal 
Court.184 
There are perhaps more signs, however, that judicial mechanisms 
remain insufficient, particularly in the context of extractive mining. 
In 2013, for example, a U.S. court dismissed a 13-year-long lawsuit 
against Anglo-Australian mining company Rio Tinto brought by Pa-
pua New Guinea residents alleging that the company improperly dis-
carded tailings and waste rock from a mining operation, engaged in 
discriminatory labor practices, and other violations.185  
Courts have dismissed a number of comparable lawsuits, including 
a lawsuit brought by Sudanese residents against Canadian-based Tal-
isman Energy alleging human rights abuses in conjunction with oil 
extraction186 and a lawsuit brought by Liberian residents alleging that 
Firestone Tire Company engaged in pervasive human rights abuses 
including illegal child labor.187 Additionally, in 2005, a lawsuit 
 183.  See Shell to face Nigeria oil spill lawsuit, BBC NEWS (Dec. 18, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35134704 (explaining that Shell was held re-
sponsible for its Nigerian subsidiary’s oil leaks and subsequent pollution). 
 184.  Lawrence Hurley, U.S. top court rejects Nestle bid to throw out child slav-
ery suit, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
court-nestle-idUSKCN0UP1L420160111. 
 185.  Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 186.  See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 
259 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that Talisman Energy was not liable for the human 
rights abuses because the Sudanese plaintiffs did not present evidence that the 
company acted with the purpose of harming civilians). 
 187.  See Jonathan Stempel, Firestone wins Liberian child labor case in US, 
REUTERS (Jul. 13, 2011, 6:01 AM), 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE76C02L20110713?pageNumber=2
&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true (explaining that United States law can hold 
companies liable for human rights abuses abroad, but did not hold Firestone tire 
company accountable for the human rights allegations against it). 
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brought by Burmese residents alleging that California-based Unocal 
was complicit in human rights abuses committed in conjunction with 
the company’s construction of a gas pipeline was settled in a confi-
dential agreement on the eve of trial.188  
IV.THE KEY ROLE OF BUSINESS HUMAN RIGHTS 
& THE U.N. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
As the last section illustrated, a serious gap in international law 
arises when injured parties seek to hold private businesses accounta-
ble for human rights violations, particularly in the context of extrac-
tive mining. The United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (“GPs”) are a welcome first step toward filling in this 
gap by creating a clear set of guidelines and expectations for private 
business while also encouraging states to take more affirmative steps 
in overseeing a private business’ respect of human rights.189 Unani-
mously endorsed in June 2011, the GPs discuss three core pillars of 
obligation: the state duty to protect, the business duty to respect, and 
the shared duty to remedy violations of human rights.190  
A. THE STATE DUTY TO PROTECT & REMEDY 
According to the GPs, States have an unequivocally recognized 
“duty under international human rights law to protect everyone with-
in their territory and/or jurisdiction from human rights abuses com-
mitted by business enterprises.”191 Under this duty, “States must pre-
vent, investigate, punish and redress human rights abuses that take 
place in domestic business operations.”192 To accomplish this goal, 
the GPs advise States to create “clear expectations” that resident 
 188.  Rachel Chambers, The Unocal Settlement: Implications for the Developing 
Law on Corporate Complicity in Human Rights Abuses, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 14 
(2005), https://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/13/unocal.pdf. Sources indicate the 
settlement provided funds for programs to improve living conditions in Myanmar 
and to protect those living in the pipeline region. See Unocal lawsuit  
(re Myanmar), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://business-
humanrights.org/en/unocal-lawsuit-re-myanmar (explaining that Myanmar alleged 
human rights abuses, which occurred during the building of a gas pipeline). 
 189.  The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: An Introduc-
tion, U.N. WORKING GROUP ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2011). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 
MANNING FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2017  2:58 PM 
2017] MINING FOR COMPROMISE IN PASTORAL GREENLAND 961 
companies can use to guide their operations, ideally preventing the 
state from needing to intervene.193 
If Greenland chooses to allow extractive mining, the GPs recom-
mend that the government should heed. First, the GPs advise States 
to enact and enforce laws requiring businesses to respect human 
rights in addition to establishing a regulatory system that fosters this 
sense of respect for human rights.194 Before Greenland issues permits 
for extraction, it should establish clear protections for the indigenous 
population that the companies must heed. The process for establish-
ing these rules and regulations should involve participation and feed-
back from the public, including the indigenous population.195 This 
would help set the tone for the mining industry’s early years in the 
region, 196 and hopefully foster a proactive approach as opposed to a 
reactive approach that relies primarily on adjudication of individual 
claims. 
Additionally, because extractive mining is an industry that encom-
passes many capacities, Greenland should pay special attention to GP 
8, which encourages states to “ensure that governmental depart-
ments, agencies and other State-based institutions that shape business 
practices are aware of and observe the State’s human rights obliga-
tions when fulfilling their respective mandates, including by provid-
ing them with relevant information, training and support.”197 In im-
plementing this guideline, states should take both “vertical and 
horizontal” approaches to ensuring policy coherence across the gov-
ernment.197 Departments that may be involved in extractive mining 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  See U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, The United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Manual for National Human 
Rights Institutions, U.N. Doc HR/PUB/13/2, 14, 26 (2012) (rationalizing that in-
digenous populations should have the opportunity to consult “on matters affecting 
their rights and interests”). 
 196.  See generally, Talking Transparency, supra note 180. 
197 U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Rem-
edy” Framework, U.N. Doc HR/PUB/11/04, 10 (2011) [hereinafter Implementing 
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework]. 
 197.  See id. at 10-11 (explaining that vertical policy is when states apply their 
own laws and policies to international human rights obligations, and horizontal 
policy is when a state’s agencies and departments further comply with the state’s 
international human rights obligations through business practices). 
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include land use, finance, water, environmental health, and interna-
tional trade, public housing, and cultural affairs.198 
Because extractive mining often involves participation from for-
eign investors and companies, Greenland “should maintain adequate 
domestic policy space to meet [its] human rights obligations when 
pursuing business-related policy objectives with other States or busi-
ness enterprises, for instance through investment treaties and con-
tracts.”199 
In addition to providing adequate protection, the GPs call on states 
to ensure that there are appropriate remedies for violations.200 This 
duty to provide appropriate remedy is necessary to ensure that the 
State duty to protect carries meaning and enforcement power.201 
Greenland should consider both procedural and substantive aspects 
of the remedy that it provides, bearing in mind that some groups may 
lack the resources or means needed to bring a complaint through ex-
isting mechanisms.202 The GPs envision a broad interpretation of the 
types of grievances that are permissible, including those based on 
“customary practice, or general notions of fairness of aggrieved 
communities.”203 Greenland should remove barriers that “prevent le-
gitimate cases from being brought before the courts in situations 
where judicial recourse is an essential part of accessing remedy or 
alternative sources of effective remedy are unavailable.”204 
 198.   See generally id. at 11-12 (explaining that, concerning business, human 
rights abuses come about in connection to territory and resources control, and sup-
porting the proposition that government departments and agencies should observe 
and comply with human rights in this context). 
 199.  Id. at 12. 
 200.  See id. at 22 (supporting the proposition that in cases of business-related 
human rights abuses, States have a duty to ensure that affected parties have access 
to remedy). 
 201.  See id. at 22 (affirming that unless States take appropriate steps to investi-
gate, redress, and punish business-related human rights abuses, their duty to protect 
is weakened). 
 202.  Accord Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, supra note 197, at 24 (explaining that regarding protecting individuals 
from business-related human rights abuses, States should pay particular attention 
to individuals from groups and populations that face a heightened risk of vulnera-
bility because such individuals often lack the resources needed to bring a com-
plaint through existing mechanisms). 
 203.  Id. at 22. 
 204.  Id. at 27. 
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Also, reports have indicated that, “at the macro-economic level, 
particularly in developing countries, the prosperity achieved by the 
mining industry rarely translates into an adequate standard of living 
for the population.”205 As a result, Greenland needs to consider fos-
tering a benefit sharing of resources, paying special attention to the 
most vulnerable groups, while providing mechanisms to remedy a 
disparate allocation of benefits derived from the mining activities.206 
The same holds true for water, which is one of the largest inputs in 
the extractive industry.207 Allowing a mining company to remove 
millions or even billions of gallons of water from a locality could 
have devastating impacts on the local population and constitute a di-
rect violation of the population’s human right to safe drinking wa-
ter.208 
Ensuring sufficient access to remedy takes on special considera-
tions in the context of indigenous populations, through insufficient 
finances, lack of information on how to bring a claim, or lack of suf-
ficient legal counsel.209 These deficiencies enter into even sharper re-
lief when compared to the staggering resources and sophistication 
that many businesses enjoy.210 Greenland should keep this imbalance 
in mind when developing regulations implanting its duty to protect 
and duty to redress. A non-judicial grievance mechanism tailored to 
extractive mining could prove to be the most effective and efficient 
 205.  Report on Human Rights Obligations Related to Hazardous Substances 
and Waste, supra note 11, ¶ 36. 
 206.  See id. (emphasizing States’ need to engage in benefit-sharing of resources 
with special attention allocated to the needs of vulnerable groups). 
 207.  See id. ¶ 39 (pointing out that no other resources regarding extraction in-
dustries and activities is more greatly affected by the extent and level of degrada-
tion, quality, and quantity than water). 
 208.  See id. ¶ 40 (stressing that extracting industries’ removal of billions of gal-
lons of water from the Earth’s hydrological cycle could undermine the availability 
of a continuous water supply for personal and domestic uses, requiring communi-
ties to travel to collect safe drinking water). 
 209.  See generally Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, supra note 197, at 23 (pointing out that, in efforts to bring a 
claim for a business-related human rights abuses, both practical and procedural dif-
ficulties can arise because of claimants’ lack of resources). 
 210.  Cf. id. at 24 (emphasizing the barriers that inhibit victims of business-
related human rights abuses from bringing claims due to an imbalance in financial 
resources and access to information). 
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mechanism for accomplishing both tasks.211 
Of particular note in this provision is the requirement that states 
give due treatment and respect to an indigenous population’s land 
tenure systems.212 This would require Greenland to respect the com-
munal land ownership system that has characterized the predomi-
nately Inuit populations in Greenland for many centuries.213 Also, it 
reiterates the importance of Greenland and Denmark’s duty to in-
clude the indigenous population in the decision-making process and 
to obtain their input regarding the introduction of an extractive min-
ing industry.214  
B. THE CORPORATE DUTY TO RESPECT 
Although the GPs provide recommendations, businesses have 
many incentives to adopt their tenants and to address human rights 
implications at the outset of a business venture. In 2015, the Interna-
tional Council on Mining & Metals (“ICMM”) produced a Good 
Practice Guide regarding indigenous people’s rights and mining 
(“GPG”). In advancing a reason why private mining companies 
should consult the GPG, the document states: “. . . companies that 
adopt good practice in relation to their interactions with Indigenous 
Peoples are likely to [enhance their reputation on the global stage as 
responsible companies].”215 Also, in many instances, mining activi-
 211.  Accord Report on Human Rights Obligations Related to Hazardous Sub-
stances and Waste, supra note 11, at 33 (advocating for States to provide non-
judicial grievance mechanisms alongside judicial mechanisms as a means of allow-
ing remedy for business-related human rights abuses). 
 212.   See id. ¶ 61 (stressing Convention No. 169’s dictates, mandating recogni-
tion of the need for special safeguards for the rights of Indigenous Peoples to natu-
ral resources). 
 213.   JENS DAHL, SAQQAQ: AN INUIT HUNTING COMMUNITY IN THE MODERN 
WORLD 157 (2000) (describing the system in Greenland as utilizing territorial 
rights inherited through generations, referring specifically to rights to land, ice, and 
water). 
 214.   Accord Report on Human Rights Obligations Related to Hazardous Sub-
stances and Waste, supra note 11, ¶ 69(g)-(h) (emphasizing that States, in accord-
ance with their obligation to respect human rights, must establish spaces of consul-
tation and collective decision-making at the local and national level when engaged 
in extracting activities). 
 215.  INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING 9 (6th ed. 2015) [hereinafter INT’L COUNCIL ON 
MINING AND METALS]. 
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ties occur in close proximity to indigenous peoples. In Australia, for 
example, there is a 60 percent of mining activities conducted adja-
cent to Aboriginal communities.216 
Additionally, companies can now expect to receive public atten-
tion and scrutiny regarding the practices they adopt affecting indige-
nous populations. The report recognizes that “[t]here is now wide-
spread recognition at the international level that Indigenous Peoples 
have distinct rights and interests, and a growing expectation that the-
se will be respected by responsible companies.”217 Companies must 
acknowledge and respect the “special relationship” that indigenous 
groups often have with the land and territories that companies with to 
mine.218 
The GPs provide that “[b]usiness enterprises should respect human 
rights.”219 Adhering to this principle means that businesses “should 
avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”220 
Businesses’ minimum obligation for respecting human rights is rec-
ognizing the rights outlined in the International Bill of Human Rights 
and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Funda-
mental Principles and Rights at Work.221 
The GPs recognize that “some human rights may be at a greater 
risk than others in particular industries or contexts, and therefore will 
be the focus of heightened attention.222A number of United Nations 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 10. 
 218.  Id. (emphasizing the special relationship that Indigenous Peoples have to 
land and resources which companies seek to explore and mine). 
 219.  Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Frame-
work, supra note 197, at 7. 
 220.  Id. at 13. 
 221.  See id. (pointing out that, at a minimum, the responsibility of business en-
terprises to respect human rights refers to those rights expressed in the Internation-
al Bill of Human Rights and in the International Labour Organization’s Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Right at Work); see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights arts. 1-3 (Dec. 10, 1948) (clarifying uni-
versal and fundamental human rights); see generally Int’l Labour Org., ILO Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Int’l Labour Conf., 86th 
Sess., ¶¶ 1-5 (June 18, 1998) (speaking of human rights obligations related to work 
and business). 
 222.  Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Frame-
work, supra note 197, at 13. 
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reports have discussed the relationship between environmental harm 
and human rights.223 These sources make it clear that functions asso-
ciated with extractive mining, like the improper disposal of toxic 
waste, exposure to harmful chemicals and radiation, and water pollu-
tion, all pose threats to well-recognized human rights.224 They have 
also recognized that indigenous populations are particularly vulnera-
ble to environmental harm due to the “close relationship” that they 
have with nature.225 
The Special Rapporteur on the human rights obligations related to 
environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous sub-
stances and waste prepared a report providing valuable insight into 
the impacts that extractive mining can have on local populations.226 
One of the largest wastes generated by mining activities is waste 
rock, which often has radioactive properties, and can harm people 
through inhalation, ingestion, or physical contact.227 Additionally, 
“[e]xposed surfaces and waste rock in impoundments or ponds, or 
buried underground, can react and create new and additional waste 
from excavation and beneficiation, which can contaminate and the 
surrounding surface and groundwater.”228 Concerning uranium min-
 223.  See World Comm. on Env’t and Dev., Our Common Future: Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 
(Aug. 4, 1987) (stating that starting point of a just and humane policy regarding 
rights to land and resources is connected to environmental awareness); see gener-
ally Rep. of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 5 (June 5-16, 1972) [hereinafter Human Environmental Re-
port] (clarifying the need to avoid adverse effects to the environment, and to make 
efforts to obtain maximum environmental benefits). 
 224.  Accord Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Independent Expert on the issue of 
human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and 
sustainable environment, Report to the General Assembly, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/25/53 (Dec. 30, 2013) (stressing that all human rights are vulnerable to en-
vironmental degradation). 
 225.  Cf. id. ¶ 40 (emphasizing that certain Indigenous Peoples are particularly 
vulnerable to environmental degradation, referencing the substantive and proce-
dural rights of these Peoples as they relate to the environment). 
 226.  See Report on Human Rights Obligations Related to Hazardous Substanc-
es and Waste, supra note 11, ¶ 20 (articulating the impacts and results on human 
health and society of introducing hazardous substances into the environment for 
extracting purposes). 
 227.  Id. ¶¶ 19-20 (pointing out that the extraction activities can produce natural-
ly-occurring radioactive materials, and discussing the disparate impact such mate-
rials have on human health when ingested or inhaled). 
 228.  Id. ¶ 18. 
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ing, the decomposition of residual materials can create radon, “an 
airborne radioactive substance which, in some countries, is the se-
cond most important cause of lung cancer after smoking.”229 Trans-
portation of hazardous materials and waste also poses substantial 
risks, including transportation-related accidents that have resulted in 
serious injuries and even death.230 
Any businesses that undertake extractive mining activities in 
Greenland should keep these unique dangers in mind and ensure that 
they are providing adequate safeguards. The companies should 
“[a]void causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts 
through their own activities, and address such impacts when they oc-
cur.”231 Businesses should also “prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or 
services . . . .”232 
These hazards pose specific risks to certain groups, including 
women, children, and indigenous populations who rely on agricul-
ture.233 “Due to the disposal of hazardous substances and waste from 
extraction activities resulting in contaminated agricultural soils, pol-
lution continues even when production stops.”234 Ingestion is one of 
the key ways in which hazardous substance exposure occurs.235 For 
example, there is proof that plants, absorb uranium during growth, 
and acid rain can destroy vital soils.236 In areas that have experienced 
uranium exposure and acid rain, fish stocks “have reduced signifi-
 229.  Id. ¶ 21. 
 230.  See id. ¶ 24 (discussing the dangers associated with the transportation of 
hazardous substances used, pointing out transportation-related accidents of these 
substances has resulted in injuries and deaths because of exposure to cyanide and 
other similar substances). 
 231.  Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Frame-
work, supra note 197, at 14. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  See Report on Human Rights Obligations Related to Hazardous Substanc-
es and Waste, supra note 11, ¶¶ 28-31 (observing that children are uniquely vul-
nerable to the effects of mercury exposure resulting from extracting activities, and 
that pregnant women are also particularly vulnerable to substance exposure due to 
extracting activities). 
 234.  Id. ¶ 34. 
 235.  See id. ¶ 20 (explaining that the dangerous impacts of ingesting hazardous 
substances occur through inhalation, ingestion, and physical contact and exposure). 
 236.  See id. ¶ 35 (explaining how plants uptake uranium, which in turn releases 
nitrous oxide into the atmosphere resulting in acid rain). 
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cantly, creating food scarcity and insecurity for communities who 
depend on fish as a main source of food, as well as a means of liveli-
hood.237 Considering that fishing is a critical industry for the Green-
landers, both as a food supply and a local economy, businesses 
should pay special attention to avoid having a negative impact on 
fishing in Greenland.238  
Although the GPs discuss the corporate duty to respect as a burden 
that businesses should undertake, Greenland must keep the GPs rec-
ommendations for businesses in mind when approving mining li-
censes and applications. For example, Greenland could require min-
ing companies to provide an overview of their policies on human 
rights, or to submit plans that show the measures these companies in-
tend to use to prevent human rights abuses from occurring while also 
providing avenues for redress and communication.239 
C. DESPITE PROGRESS, PROBLEMS REMAIN 
The GPs contain many well-aimed principles that would likely 
prove useful in establishing a proactive framework for mining in 
Greenland. Due to their voluntary nature, however, States have lee-
way to apply them in a piecemeal fashion or to adopt interpretations 
that gut their true spirit. Although Greenland has made progress to-
ward implementing the GPs through the enactment of a National Ac-
tion Plan, it fails to make any mention of extractive mining activities 
or the risks associated therewith.240 And while Denmark has enacted 
a National Action Plan discussing its strategy for implementing the 
 237.  Id. 
 238.   See Food and Agric. Org. of the U.N., FAO Fishery Country Profile – 
Greenland, FID/CP/GRL (Oct. 2004), http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/ 
GRL/profile.htm (demonstrating the importance of the fishing industry to Green-
land with quantifiable data specifying the value of exports and per capita). 
 239.  Accord About Our Human Rights Policy, CHEVRON, https://www. 
chevron.com/~/media/chevron/shared/documents/AboutOurHumanRightsPolicy 
(discussing corporate responsibility as it relates to human rights and extraction ac-
tivities, emphasizing a need for companies and corporations to be cognizant of pro-
tecting human rights in the areas where they operate). 
 240.  Cf. Sofie Erbs, Government of Greenland, The National Action Plan 
 in Greenland, GOV’T OF GREENLAND (2015), http://naalakkersuisut.gl 
/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Fiskeri_Fangst_Landbrug/ Polar-
bear%202015/second%20day/75%20%20pp%20NAP%20Greenland.pdf (delineat-
ing the environmental concerns for Greenland). 
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UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the docu-
ment also fails to make mention of the unique and highly sensitive 
issues associated with extractive mining and indigenous popula-
tions.241  
As a whole, the mining industry appears to be aware of the unique 
challenges and considerations that come with conducting extractive 
mining activities near indigenous populations and in environmentally 
sensitive regions. The International Council on Mining and Metals’ 
Indigenous Peoples and Mining Good Practice Guide foster the same 
core principles of the GPs while also embracing general human 
rights principles.242 They also advise mining companies to promote 
the social, cultural, and economic health of the regions in which they 
operate.243 If the recent disaster in the Minas Gerais mining region of 
Brazil is any indication, however, the mining industry has a long way 
to go toward fulfilling the GPs’ aims.244 Minas Gerais also raises 
questions regarding how diligently States have approached their du-
ties under International Law when it comes to extractive mining.245 
V. CONCLUSION 
Greenland and its indigenous population have a major decision to 
make. The risks and dangers associated with extractive mining are 
many, touching almost every facet of society, including environmen-
tal integrity, public health, economic vitality, cultural preservation, 
and quality of life. Although there are a number of critical problems 
that remain to be addressed, there are signs of promise that a proac-
tive approach can be achieved and indicia that progress is being 
made toward making that promise a reality. 
 241.  Cf. Danish National Action Plan, DANISH GOV’T (2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/Denmark_ 
NationalPlanBHR.pdf (discussing the plans and strategy to implement the UN pro-
tocol). 
 242.  See INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, supra note 215, at 17 (em-
phasizing that ICMM members commit to respecting the rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples, in particular those set forth by the United Nations). 
 243.  See id. at 31 (stressing that there are basic steps that can be taken to reduce 
the scale of negative impacts in mining projects). 
 244.   See Douglas, supra note 1 (discussing the collapse of a dam in Minas Ge-
rais, Brazil, resulting in the release of toxic mud). 
 245.  See id. (discussing the efforts of the Brazilian congress to reform domestic 
law that would diminish environmental regulation). 
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If the government chooses to proceed with resource extraction, it 
must heed the requirements provided in the ICCPR, ICESCR, 
ECHR, and DRIP when implementing an extractive mining regime. 
Should the indigenous people find themselves needing to bring an 
action before the Committee alleging violations of the ICCPR, it 
must construct its argument carefully to show a readily ascertainable 
harm to its long-standing practices and enjoyment of its culture.  
Ideally, Greenland and the private companies eager to mine the 
region will look to the Guiding Principles and Business Human 
Rights to create a framework that promotes access to information, 
includes public participation in decision-making, provides an avenue 
for legal redress, and which clearly encompasses private parties as 
duty bearers. These mechanisms and other approaches presented in 
this paper will help Greenland and private mining companies to en-
sure that there is respect, protection, and remedies for indigenous 
population’s right to food. Through this paradigm, Greenland can 
hopefully avoid finding itself facing the same environmental devasta-
tion that the people of Brazil are facing today. 
